Secondly, there is also the issue of human reducibility. Humans construct and look after computational processes, certainly. But to suggest that they are thoroughly reducible to human interaction, risks placing human values onto an independent process where nothing ‘human’ can be found. This is something that Joseph Weizenbaum repeatedly stated, although I wouldn’t endorse his reliance to differentiate human agency from computer agency by a factor of ‘choice’.

BTW, I’m not so sure I have a issue with “decorative” works. It seems to me that computer technology is primarily presented, sold and seen as tools to be either economically productive or to consume content. We here also use it for art, but when I’m totally honest with myself I have to say that lot of the time I also simply enjoy playing it for the joy of playing. The violin can be used to convey profound emotions, it might also be used to play some simple “decorative” ditties for the enjoyment of the musician and all there. I like to play compilers and DIY instruments like that, there may not always be a grandiose purpose behind it all and I’ve never had people complain about that.
Perhaps that is what I’m missing; the possibility for digital works to convey deep thoughts is getting accepted but the value in the simple joy of playing digital systems outside of any clear motivation beyond that joy doesn’t yet seem to have found it’s spot in modern culture. That might place decorative works in a awkward position and indeed make the works themselves a bit awkward.

“It was recognised [by the CIA] that Abstract Expression- ism was the kind of art that made Socialist Realism look even more stylised and more rigid and confined than it was. And that relationship was exploited in some of the exhibitions.”

Makes you wonder whether any art movement is totally without some kind of sinister backing lurking in the shadows..

It is a post-modern dogma that all art must be critical (in a certain sense), but it ain’t necessarily so. I see a parallel between computer art and early abstract art. The early abstract artists had to persuade themselves that they weren’t being merely decorative, and they did this by invoking the spiritual (Kandinsky), the Zeitgeist or revolutionary spirit of the new machine age (the Futurists), and so on. It is not surprising that the earliest computer artists engaged in uncritical exploration of new techniques (with or without corporate sponsorship), but soon the question surely arose: how is this not purely decorative? The post-modern idea of critical art came to the rescue: see, we’re not being decorative, we’re not even (merely) making socially useful art, we’re making Critical Art! But there is more to art than critical art. (And did anyone attack the Iliac Suite after the fact for not being critical?) In these post-post-modern times it is an interesting challenge for computer-based art to move beyond simple exploration of new techniques, beyond the purely decorative, beyond the reflexive exploration of the performativity of code, and beyond the post-modern strait-jacket of critical art.

Apologies for the parody of the history!

Firstly note that in writing this I was reconsidering my own practice as someone who does not create artworks with explicit political content either. This was as much about introspection as anything else, although this got lost a bit as I got into a slightly argumentative mode of discussion with Philip. I found it useful to question my own position and the environment I work in.

I did consider the design context of the V&A and design subtext of the description of the exhibition. I think most of the exhibitors would describe themselves as artists rather than designers though, and on the whole the literature from the exhibition and sponsor does that… I think this exhibition is a good representation of mainstream digital arts.

I also thought decode was a hall of mirrors, literally so in many (perhaps the majority?) of the works.

I agree heartily that the human artist can’t be written out of computer art. What I’m trying to say is that by focussing on autonomy, we’re giving up responsibility for the content of the work and closing off possibilities. You’re right though, I did tie myself in knots a little over this due to the afore-mentioned argumentative streak (which continued on the eu-gene list for a while).

Although I’m taking an extreme view against my own practice, I agree a continuum is healthy. I think the decode exhibition was also an extreme, though.

Fair point about funding too, and Kassen makes a very good point that governmental funding has its own problems. It of course can be a positive thing for an institution or company to provide funding for the arts, but commissioning artists to communicate their corporate goals as the grand entrance to a digital arts exhibition is very strange.

cheers

alex

A few points:

1. This quiet exclusion of explicitly political work, in favour of ludic interactivity, is a very disturbing thought. Of course, there is something political about the democratisation of the artwork (and Metzger’s self destructive objects) blah blah, but I know this isn’t what you are getting at.

However, I’d wager that in 1968, the radical newness of these forms (robotics, kinetic art, synthetic biology, interactive sound machines, etc) would surely preoccupy the visitor and the artist. Trying to cram both the technologically new and the politically profound could dilute the message so thinly to become meaningless. Isn’t it the case that any artform in its early stage is first focused on the materiality of the form itself? Take early video art, sound art, or net art – all began with investigations of their own medium (thinking Nam June Paik, Christian Marclay, etc) and only later branched out to more overtly political messages (Marclay’s guitar drag). I think this is a pretty common trend in art history.

So, though the list of sponsors is pretty scary, I do wonder how different the artworks’ critical engagement would have been without it.

2. This lack of criticality in digital art is less justifiable nowadays, now it is a firmly established form. I was entirely underwhelmed by Decode, which felt basically like a glorified hall of mirrors and totally evoked the “winking lights, flickering television screens and the squawks” that Usselman cites.

However, do remember that Decode was an exhibition of digital design, not fine art, and should be judged as such. In terms of the objects, systems and interfaces that it showcased, it was moderately more interesting. But don’t expect profound explicit messages.

I think this distinction is very important, as a million identikit openFrameworks/openCV installations pop up and are presented as meaningful artwork because they consist of some kind of banal visually-based interactivity. This is design, or gaming, or art-lite.

3. From your post: generative art “negates intentionality: the artworks are divorced from any human author, and considered only for their aesthetic”. I strongly disagree! It relocates intentionality, and changes the role of the author to a meta-composer. Brings to mind the Cage quote, in which an artist’s choices consist in choosing what questions to ask…

I think it’s naive to claim that any generative work, no matter how autonomous, is not still the direct work of the artist-programmer behind it. My work that incorporates generative process does so in order to multiply its outputs, introducing some element of surprise but without doing stuff that I would attribute to the process per se – more as a conjunctive, distributed agency.

I don’t fully get your response to Philip re L-systems. I don’t think it makes much sense to say which is “more” autonomous, though with indeterminacy and context-based decision rules (which any Hollywood grammar would use) they can become so. And they certainly fall right into his definition of generativity (“any art practice where the artist uses a system, such as a set of natural language rules, a computer program, a machine, or other procedural invention, which is set into motion with some degree of autonomy contributing to or resulting in a completed work of art”).

It seems a bit like you are objecting to his example of a less-autonomous case by saying it is not autonomous at all, thus not generative, thus not a valid example!

The concluding point is, of course, the old chestnut: it’s all a continuum, there are varying degrees of generativity, varying degrees of political overtness, etc. But though most may be playthings, sketches or experiments, that is no reason to abandon the whole form.

4. I’m sure I had more than 4 points — might add to this later. I do have a continued interest in the topic, as some of the work that I do is very expensive to produce and install, way beyond my means and those of some other galleries/host institutions/funding bodies. A recent installation had backing from a corporate entity whose interests are divergent to my own. They provided complete backing, and genuinely engaged with the project and its ideas without any attempt to extract anything further (let alone impact on its direction or ideas). They did not ask for any explicit association on the project’s publicity itself. As far as I could see, the negative ramifications of accepting the backing were almost nonexistent. Your post has given me a lot to think about however, in terms of activities that commercial backing subtly discourages. So, thanks!

http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/context-machines-series-autonomous-self-organizing-site-specific-artworks
http://www.ekran.org/ben/wp/2011/is-generative-art-formal-or-conceptual/
http://mwatz.tumblr.com/post/13279924274/concept-vs-form
http://www.ekran.org/ben/wp/2011/emphasis-abstraction-and-richness/
http://www.ekran.org/ben/writing/Ben-Bogart-Thesis.pdf

I think you are making a lot of assumptions about generative art that do not apply as broadly as presented.